Assyrians and The Syrian Kurds in the Constitutional Committee

2020-01-01
Syrian Kurdish Writer: Shvan Ibrahim

Biderson provided a briefing to the Security Council, which stated in its third item, "Determining a timetable and process for drafting a new constitution." It is clear that the Syrian state is totally rejecting item. Biderson complements that constitutional reform, among other things, is the embodiment of the twelve fundamental principles of the Syrian-Syrian living that emerged from the Geneva path, where the first article, written below, in those principles came as a severe blow to the Kurdish aspirations:
1- Respect and full commitment to the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Syria / the Syrian Arab Republic.
While in Article 11 of the document signed between the two parties, the Kurdish Council agreed with the Coalition about naming the Syrian state as "adopting the name of the state during the era of independence", meaning naming it in the name of the Syrian State or the Syrian Republic.
There is an important point in the article indicates the obligation of the Syrian opposition to demand the return of Syrian lands to its owners:
In this regard, no part of the national territory may be relinquished and the Syrian people remain committed to the restoration of the occupied Golan by all legitimate and legal means in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law.

If Golan is claimed, this requires the demand for the return of Afrin and the areas of the Euphrates Shield and Sri Kaneh. It is the last bump for the Syrian opposition, which resides in Turkey, and it will not be able to ask the latter to leave these lands.

As stated in the fourth item:
Syria / The Syrian Arab Republic shall be a non-sectarian, democratic state based on political pluralism, equal citizenship…etc.

In the margins of the text, the following was stated: “The envoy’s office did not use a secular phrase, and it is recorded, that it is not sectarian, and it appeared in Security Council Resolution 2254, and that the secular term is not included in the Syrian constitution, which includes secular and religious elements. This is an issue that is decided by The Syrians alone

* This worries the Syrians and Assyrians about their fate in Syria and the new constitution and their demand for a secular constitution that separates religion from state power and refuses that the religious text be the only source of legislation. Furthermore, if one or more representatives of the Democratic Union system were included in the constitutional committee, and this is possible if it was agreed between them and the Syrian state, the Kurdish obsession equation will not change, and the Kurdish scene may be complicated within the small or large bodies because of the following possibilities:

1- The Parliament and the Democratic Union will represent a to threat to the Kurdish issue, unless an explicit political project and demand is agreed upon without words and structures that can be interpreted in the future.

2-The Council’s withdrawal from the Constitutional Committee is a contribution to diluting and blowing up the Kurdish issue for two compelling reasons:
The first of them is that the negotiating delegations will not agree on a basic and clear principle which is, "Will the current regime have the right to run for the 2021 elections? Or not.'' It is a decisive principle and it is impossible to be accepted, noting that the representatives of the Syrian government within the third are more than independents or close to the Syrian opposition."
The second of them is that the committee was formed by a decision, pressure, as well as international and effective actors and the decision-maker in the Syrian file, and even the Syrian opposition, which was requiring the departure of the regime or the start of the transitional phase, that begins writing a new constitution, rejected all the decisions of Geneva 1 and UN resolution 2245 and accepted the constitutional committee, then, why the Kurdish delegation has to withdrew?

3-The procedural list of negotiations is clear even if the Kurdish representation in the microcosm increased to / 10 / representatives out of / 50 /. In addition, it needs 34 votes, and within the large body / 20 / representatives out of / 150 /, where it needs 113 votes to agree on any item that was not agreed upon, then Kurdish anxiety will not be solved by the numerical increase alone. Accordingly, the Assyrians are also under the threat of preserving the Arab identity of the Syrian state, the concerns of the survival of the legislation, the determination of the head of state’s religion, the position on freedoms and the rights of religions according to what the interest of those religions deems necessary and not as desired by the negotiator from both sides.

4-Since the Kurds and other nationalities and religions have always been satisfied with keeping pace with the Syrian opposition and joining the negotiating body, the only solution for these minorities is subjected to several proposals:

- - Staying within the negotiating bodies and the constitutional committee and relying on the international community for what they impose on the negotiators over the constitutional principles, or the form of the state and the system of government, so that it protects the constitutional rights and preserves the national identities of those peoples in the next constitution.

- Even if the Kurds find themselves heading towards the Syrian state, the most powerful thing is asserting political rights with a Russian guarantee, and heading together with a united political vision.
- It is expected that the constitutional conflict will be prolonged and a fierce battle between the two parties. This battle, will lead, in the end, to the dismantling of the committee and the return of each party to its positions, which means that a more fierce and deadly phase will begin in Syria, particularly if America had an intention to dump Russia and Iran more than that in the Syrian situation, such as the case of Afghans and what Russia will suffer at the time, and fueling conflicts and tensions within the Iranian interior again.

With regard to the two items mentioned above, many societal groups will object to their confirmation, and it is possible that the committee will witness a coalition of minorities followed by taking a position that embarrasses the situation further.